

217

**Top Secret**

(Security Classification)

| TO: | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
|-----|------------------|------|----------|
| 1   | AK               |      |          |
| 2   |                  |      |          |
| 3   |                  |      |          |
| 4   |                  |      |          |


|                                      |                                       |   |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION      | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL    | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH     | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT     | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE         | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION  | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE      |

REMARKS:

| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. | DATE |
|------------------------------------|------|
|                                    |      |
|                                    |      |

CONTROL NO.

25X1



25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE  
Tuesday February 15, 1977 CG NIDC 77-037C

State Department review completed



**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

25X1

**Top Secret**

(Security Classification)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, February 15, 1977.

25X1

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

25X1

USSR: Article on Dissidence Page 1

25X1

EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE Page 4

YUGOSLAVIA: New Premier Page 6

WEST GERMANY: Arms Sales Page 7

25X1

ANGUILLA: British Ship on Watch Page 9

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

USSR: Article on Dissidence

25X1

[ ] The Soviets have sharply increased their counteroffensive against Western policies in support of human rights in the USSR. A major unsigned article in *Pravda* on Saturday made it clear that the Soviets view the control of internal dissidence as a fundamental ideological issue. The article undoubtedly was cleared at the highest level of the party and thus is a definitive statement of the Soviet position on human rights as a factor in international and in particular US-Soviet relations.

25X1

[ ] Lengthy, tough, and strident, the *Pravda* article served notice to dissidents that major doctrinal issues are at stake and that further agitation will be viewed as subversion. The article said "bourgeois survivals" still exist in the USSR, and called for "high political vigilance" against such "noxious remnants of the old corrupt society."

25X1

[ ] The *Pravda* article was intended primarily for the West, however, particularly the US. The article charged Western opponents of detente with organizing a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign on the issue of human rights. *Pravda* charged that the campaign is designed to slander socialism, undermine the Helsinki accords, and sow confusion and disunity within the communist movement.

25X1

[ ] The article did not directly criticize President Carter or Secretary Vance, but it condemned the statements issued by the Department of State in support of Soviet and Czechoslovak human rights dissidents. It called the statements blatant interference in the internal affairs of socialist states and as such totally unacceptable to the USSR and incompatible with detente policies and with the spirit of the Helsinki agreements.

25X1

[ ] The article does not break much new ground in Soviet views on dissidence, but it raises these views to the level of an authoritative, unequivocal policy statement. It is also an indication that Western attention to Soviet domestic conditions and the impact of such attention on Soviet foreign policy goals is an increasing source of concern and irritation for the Soviets.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

25X1

[ ] This has become particularly true as dissidents in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have increased their public activity in anticipation of the meeting in Belgrade this June to review progress on the implementation of the August 1975 Helsinki accords.

25X1

[ ] Both the dissidents and the authorities are aware that the foreign publicity on internal conditions can be a real influence on events. Foreign support is often the dissidents' only defense against persecution, but the Soviet and East European regimes have often reacted with an even heavier hand when they have felt that such outside support impinged on internal discipline or basic ideological principles.

25X1

[ ] *Pravda* has made it clear that such a situation now exists and that the arrests of leading members of the unofficial group monitoring Soviet compliance with the Helsinki accords--the so-called Orlov group--must be seen in that light. *Pravda's* references to the dissidents' violations of Soviet laws suggest that some, if not all, of them will be tried, regardless of the cost to the Soviet image abroad. This, in turn, indicates that the Soviet leadership has decided to meet the human rights issue and the Western challenge head-on.

25X1

[ ] By focusing the *Pravda* article on human rights, the Soviets have indicated that they are, for the moment, intent on staking out a public "principled position" making clear their intention to brook no interference in what they consider internal affairs, even as they seek to pursue improved relations with the West in other areas. The article's citation of certain foreign policy sections of a speech last month by General Secretary Brezhnev is probably designed to suggest that these other areas may also be affected in the future, however, if the Western campaign on behalf of human rights continues.

25X1

[ ] *Pravda's* charge that one of the goals of the Western campaign is to sow disunity within the international communist movement indicates that the US-Soviet relationship is not Moscow's only worry. Open Soviet irritation with the independent attitudes of some Western communist parties has been increasing, particularly as these parties seek to put distance between their own and Moscow's records on human rights.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] To Moscow's discomfiture, *Pravda's* statement is likely, if possible, to be one topic on the agenda of a reportedly scheduled meeting of the French, Italian, and Spanish parties in Madrid some time in the next few weeks. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE

25X1 [ ] //In a joint communique issued at the meeting in Tunisia last weekend of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the EC Nine reaffirmed a policy generally favorable to Arab interests. The communique, in effect, reiterated a statement that had been adopted by the EC foreign ministers on January 31 but was withheld from publication after objections from the US. The statement stressed recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as a basic element in a Middle East peace.//

25X1 [ ] //The West Europeans also expressed concern about continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories and opposed the Israeli policy of establishing settlements there and changing the status of Jerusalem unilaterally. West European officials agreed to study an Arab proposal to establish a political committee within the Dialogue.//

25X1 [ ] //Although the communique breaks no new ground, agreement by the West Europeans to such an extensive and detailed political statement suggests that most EC countries now accept political talks as an inevitable aspect of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, despite the risk that such exchanges could be difficult or embarrassing. West European officials have argued that, because the Arabs want their political support, such talks might in turn help moderate Arab views.//

25X1 [ ] //In preparing the statement on the Middle East originally intended for public release on January 31, EC foreign ministers acted on the belief that conditions have now become favorable for movement toward renewed negotiations aiming at a Middle East settlement. They also argue that Egyptian President Sadat's current position makes early progress especially urgent.//

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

[REDACTED] //Egypt and Saudi Arabia have strongly urged a West European contribution to the growing momentum toward negotiations, especially in the form of new support for Palestinian interests. The Arabs see EC statements as a means of bringing pressure on the US to move in a direction that favors Arab preferences.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //The West Europeans fear that if they remain silent on the Middle East out of deference to US initiatives, they may be shut out of a role in the search for a settlement.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //Recent US and Israeli statements may give West European officials second thoughts about expressing their views on the Middle East openly, but the depth of West European interest in a successful relationship with the Arab world in a period of economic and political uncertainty will doubtless lead them to seek some form of active participation in efforts to resolve Middle East issues. Although some West Europeans believe the French are considering an independent initiative, recent efforts to elaborate a common policy on the Middle East within the EC framework and in the Euro-Arab Dialogue may help restrain such individual initiatives. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]



25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

25X1

25X1

#### YUGOSLAVIA: New Premier

25X1

[ ] The naming of the new Yugoslav premier--Veselin Djuranovic, the party leader of the Montenegrin Republic--appears to set the stage for more high-level changes. Djuranovic replaces Djemal Bijedic, a Muslim, who was killed in an airplane crash last month.

25X1

[ ] The ethnic makeup of the government now heavily favors Serbs and Montenegrins, who hold three of the five senior positions in the Council of Ministers. In addition, the foreign affairs and defense portfolios are held by Serbs.

25X1

[ ] Serbs and Montenegrins make up less than 45 percent of Yugoslavia's population, and the other minorities will insist on proportional sharing of top-level positions. If the leadership does not act quickly to right the imbalance, it will face increasing nationalist strains.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

[redacted] Foreign Minister Minic and Defense Minister Ljubicic have been widely rumored to be moving to other jobs. If so, non-Serbs will probably move into their posts.

25X1

[redacted] Djuranovic, 52 years old, is a good deal younger than most of the other top leaders. His experience has been largely confined to Montenegro, however, and he may have trouble adjusting to the national responsibilities of the premiership. One of his predecessor's principal duties was politicking in the republics for Belgrade's economic programs and policies. Djuranovic has little economic experience. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

#### WEST GERMANY: Arms Sales

25X1

[redacted] West German officials have commented to US officials that the government's approval of recent arms sales to Indonesia and Turkey does not represent a change in West Germany's policy of not selling arms to "areas of tension." The officials indicated that Bonn must guard against the danger that these "one-time exceptions" might become the rule. They hinted, however, that other exceptions might be made to permit sales to African and Asian countries; they specifically mentioned Nigeria.

25X1

[redacted] The West German government agreed earlier this month to sell two submarines to Indonesia on credit and to underwrite most of the financing for a large commercial arms deal--estimated to be worth \$500 million--between West German firms and Turkey.

25X1

[redacted] One West German official said that the strength of the shipbuilding lobby had overcome Finance Minister Apel's objections to the Indonesian deal. The government was aware, moreover, of the political benefits to be reaped in the shipbuilding areas of Hamburg and Kiel, where unemployment is high.

25X1

[redacted] The decision to back the deal with Turkey was based on political and strategic, rather than commercial, considerations. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

25X1

#### ANGUILLA: British Ship on Watch

25X1

[REDACTED] //A British frigate is standing by off the eastern Caribbean island of Anguilla, a British dependency where protest demonstrations led by former chief minister Ronald Webster resulted in some outbreaks of violence last week.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //The British have taken similar "display of force" precautions in the past when political disturbances in the area seemed in danger of getting beyond the control of local authorities. The presence of the ship is usually enough to dampen any further disorders.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //The demonstrations began when Webster, who recently lost a confidence vote in the island's legislature, led his followers into the streets to protest the decision of the resident British commissioner to designate a minister in Webster's cabinet to form a government rather than call a new election as Webster had demanded.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //The new chief minister, Emile Gumbs, is comparatively unknown, but he apparently takes as hard a line as Webster on keeping Anguilla out of a grouping with St. Kitts and Nevis that the British had at one time sought to establish as a move toward eventual independence for the islands.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //Webster has been the dominant figure in Anguillian politics since he led the island's 6,000 people in a successful "rebellion" against St. Kitts and Nevis in 1967. Both

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

he and Gumbs favor preserving direct connections with the UK-- including Britain's financial assistance for the island's precarious economy--in preference to being dominated by St. Kitts in a three-island independent state.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3

**Top Secret**

(Security Classification)

**Top Secret**

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010026-3